Abstract. Homotopy Type theory and its Model theory provide a novel formal semantic framework for representing scientific theories. This framework supports a constructive view of theories according to which a theory is essentially characterised by its methods.
Introduction
During the second half of the 20th century Evert Beth, Patrick Suppes, Bas van Fraassen followed by a large group of other contributors developed an approach to formal representation and formal logical analysis of scientific theories, which became known under the name of semantic view of theories 2 . This approach was proposed as a replacement for a different approach to the same subject developed several decades earlier by logical positivists including Rudolf Carnap, Carl Gustav "Peter" Hempel and Ernest Nagel. The proponents of the new semantic view dubbed the older approach syntactic. They used resources of the recently emerged Model theory and argued that a formal representation of scientific theories should first of all account for the intended semantics of these theories and leave aloof many syntactic details studied by their predecessors. Model theory helped these people
Date: March 5, 2018. 1 The work is supported by Russian State Foundations for Humanities, research grant number 13-03-00384. 2 For an overview of the early history of the semantic view see [40] , Part 1, Prologue.
to develop and defend a "new picture of theories" [45, p. 64] where the semantic aspect played the leading role.
As a number of authors remarked more recently, from the viewpoint of today's theories of formal semantics it appears that the proponents of the "semantic" approach at that time did not properly understand the involved relationships between syntactic and semantic aspects of formal theories, and for this reason often conceived of these relationships as a form of concurrence. As it became clear more recently the model-theoretic concepts used by the proponents of the semantic view could not be rigorously defined in an open air without taking related syntactic issues into consideration [11, 19, 4] .
Nevetheless the "fight against the syntax" led by the proponents of the semantic view did not reduce to a mere rhetoric. Suppes had a strong insight according to which a general framework appropriate for formal representation of scientific theories should not involve arbitrary syntactic choices but should be invariant with respect to translations between different formal representations of the same theory. Suppes' epistemological emphasis on the invariant character of (non-formalized) theories in Physics and Geometry makes it evident where this insight comes from; in particular, Suppes is motivated here by the geometrical Erlangen Program [41, p. 99] ). It is clear that the idea of invariant formal representational framework for scientific theories cannot be realised via disregarding syntactic issues; on the contrary, this project calls for new syntactic inventions 3 Let us conclude this Introduction with a short statement that expresses our take on the debate between the syntactic and the semantic views of theories. Following Halvorson we take this issue to be mostly historical. In order to evaluate the contribution of the semantic 3 Halvorson and Glymour rightly observe that the realisation of such a project requires, in particular, to develop an appropriate notion of equivalence of theories, which is still missing [10, 9] . Interestingly, the pioneering works of Bill Lawvere in categorical logic published in the 1960-ies were equally driven by the desire to avoid syntactic arbitrariness; in addition to examples of invariant theories borrowed from Geometry and Physics Lawvere used Hegel's notion of objective logic as a motivation for his groundbreaking research [33, 5.8] .
view properly this approach should be compared with earlier attempts to use formal logical methods in science and in the philosophy of science but not with an artificially construed "syntactic view" which has been hardly ever defended by anyone. These earlier attempts did not involve and could not involve anything like formal semantics, which emerged later.
When Nagel and his contemporaries considered possible applications of mathematical logic in the representation of scientific theories the formal part of their work was necessarily limited to syntactic issues. The intended semantics of formal theories these authors described informally by associating with appropriate symbols and symbolic expressions certain empirical and mathematical contents in the same traditional manner in which logicians did this since Aristotle. Suppes and other pioneers of the new "semantic" approach used a mathematical theory of semantics, viz. Tarski's set-theoretic semantics, as an additional intermediate layer of formal representation between the symbolic syntax of formal theory F and the contents of scientific theory T which F formally represents. In order to recognise the importance of this formal semantic layer one doesn't need to downplay the role of syntax. In that conservative sense the semantic view is clearly more advanced than its "syntactic" predecessor. However we argue in what follows that the "semantic turn" also left aside some important insights of Nagel's "syntactic" approach, which we are trying to save from the oblivion in this paper by using a new formal technique.
Constructive View of Theories
The once-received [11] aka syntactic view of theories and the more recent semantic view developed by Suppes and his followers were equally motivated by their contemporary developments in logic and foundations of mathematics: while logical positivists of the older generation were motivated by the rise of new symbolic logic on the edge between the 19-th and the 20th centuries, the younger generation of researchers in the 1950-ies was motivated by the rise of Model theory and formal semantics. In this paper we stick to the same pattern and base our proposal on the recently emerged Homotopy Type theory (HoTT) and the closely related research on the Univalent Foundations of mathematics. The view of theories that we arrive at is a version of the non-statement view according to which a theory, generally, does not reduce either to a bare class of sentences or to a class of statements ordered by the relation of logical consequence. But this proposed view, which hereafter we call constructive, differs from the usual semantic view in how it answers the question "What are fundamental constituents of a theory (except its sentences)? A proponent of the standard semantic view's answers "models". A proponent of the constructive view answers "methods".
As a general philosophical view on scientific theories the constructive view is not new: the fundamental role of methods in science has been stressed in the past by many philosophers from René Descartes to Ernest Nagel (see 3.1 below). That methods (including mathematical, experimental and observational methods) are abound in today's science hardly needs a special justification. The specification of relevant methods called by scientists a
"methodology" (which should not be confused with the methodology of science in the sense used by philosophers) makes an important part of any piece of scientific knowledge (but not
only of an open-ended scientific research). However we still lack convenient formal logical frameworks for representing methods as proper elements of scientific theories. In (4.1) we explain why standard logical and semantic means are not appropriate for the task. In (5) we show how HoTT helps to solve this problem. In the next Section 3 we take a closer look at Nagel's and Suppes work, which gives us some additional motivations for our proposed notion of constructive theory. By an axiomatic theory Nagel understands a Hilbert-style formal theory 5 ; he stresses the fact that that such a theory has no bearing on the material truth of its axioms and theorems. Nagel describes an axiomatic theory as a hypothetico-deductive structure, which represents objective relations of logical consequence between its sentences and only eventually may "conform" to the "world of existence". Whether or not a given axiomatic theory conforms to the world is an empirical question that cannot be answered within this given theory:
The deduction makes no appeal whatsoever to experiment or observation, 
How to represent methods with symbolic calculi
Knowing a method amounts to knowing how to perform certain operations, which bring certain wanted outcome. One can distinguish between different senses in which a particular method can be known by an epistemic agent. It is possible that an agent is aware about certain instruction and can repeat it by hart but is unable to implement it in certain circumstances. It is also possible that an agent is capable to perform an operation and get the wanted outcome without being aware of a formal linguistic description of this operation.
For a contingent historical reason the current epistemological discussion on knowledge-how is mainly focused on examples of this latter sort such as one's knowledge how to ride a bicycle [5] . Here, on the contrary, we focus on explicit knowledge-how, that is, the sort of knowledge-how, which is representable in the form of explicit rules and algorithms. In this paper we leave aside the analysis of epistemic attitudes and relations to syntactically represented methods and focus on the form of their representation. Axioms are fixed distinguished formulae, which serve as generators for syntactic derivations.
It is common to identify axioms with rules with the empty set of premises (which requires a more general concept of rule than we use here). However since the conceptual difference between rules and axioms plays an important rule in our argument, we shall not use such a formal identification. 6 This definition of syntactic rule leaves aside non-functional rules with multiple conclusions, which are also considered in some logical theories. However this limitation is not essential for the purpose of this paper.
Hypotheses are also distinguished formulae, which in derivations function like axioms. The difference between axioms and hypotheses concerns their mutual roles in the formal framework (that typically has a form of formal theory in which derivations are exhibited: while the set of axioms is fixed the sets of hypotheses vary from one derivation to another.
The last formula F k in d is conveniently called a theorem and it is said that F k is derived from the axioms and hypotheses, which belong to (or are used in) d, according to syntactic rules applied in d for obtaining other formulae. Notice that the sequence of formulae F 1 , . . . , F k does not provide the full information about the syntactic derivation as a fully determined syntactic procedure. In order to make the full information explicit each formula
. . , F k needs to be supplied with a commentary, which specifies whether it is an axiom or a hypothesis or, by default, which rule has been used for obtaining it and with which premises.
In standard logical calculi including Classical propositional and first-order calculi wellformed formulae are supposed to express certain statements; this is the intended preformal semantics of these formulae. Accordingly, the syntactic rules used in these calculi such as modus ponens are interpreted as logical rules, which allow one, given some true statements in such a formal framework serve for clarifying logical relations (the precise character of which will be discussed shortly) between different theoretical statements but they cannot by themselves help one to verify these sentences. The task of verification aka proof 7 of theoretical statements is still reserved to empirical methods from T , which do not belong to T F but may play a role in a meta-theory of T F , which shows that T F is empirically adequate or inadequate.
Thus T F can be called a physical theory only in a peculiar sense of the word, which leaves central issues concerning the verification of a given theory outside this very theory. This certainly does not correspond to how the word "theory" is colloquially used by working scientists. It might be argued that even if T F fails to represent adequately all epistemologically relevant aspects of physical theory T it still does satisfactorily represent its logical aspects. However this claim is also objectionable because it takes for granted a view of logic, which is not uncontroversial to say the least. One who shares Nagel's understanding 7 The word "proof" used in such a context is ambiguous because it can also refer to formal deductions of theorems from axioms in TF . It might seem to be a reasonable terminological decision, which would be more in line with the current logical parlance, to reserve term "proof" for formal deductions and talk of verifications or justifications in more general contexts including empirical ones. However following Nagel 3.1 and Prawitz [30] we believe that such a terminological habit hides the problem rather than helps to solve it. Under certain semantic conditions a syntactic derivation aka formal proof F1, . . . , F k of formula F k indeed may represent a proof of statement expressed by this formula, i.e., may represent a conclusive evidence in favour of this statement. In order to study and specify such semantic conditions one needs to evaluate whether or not a given interpretation of one's syntax makes syntactic derivations into proofs. The bold identification of proofs with syntactic derivations makes such a critical analysis impossible.
of the scope of logic can argue that since T F leaves aside issues concerning the verification/proof/evidencing of T -statements it fails to capture the very logical core of T .
Does the same argument apply to theories of pure mathematics? The claim that computing an integral reduces to (or even "ultimately is") a logical deduction from axioms (say, the axioms of ZFC) and some additional hypotheses appears more plausible than a parallel claim about physical measurements; in spite of the fact that this way of computing integrals is not used in the current mathematical practice its theoretical possibility can be reasonably explained and justified by referring to standard set-theoretic foundations of the Integral
Calculus. On such grounds one may argue that in the case of pure mathematics the above argument does not apply. However in fact the standard Hilbert-style axiomatic framework combined with (some version of) axioms of Set theory doesn't provide a systematic account of evidencing mathematical statements just as it doesn't provide an account of evidencing empirical statements. Thirdly, there is the problem of gap between the technical notion of (formal) proof as logical deduction from axioms of Set theory and the colloquial concept of mathematical proof used in today's mathematics.
Some people see this latter problem as merely pragmatic or "practical" and having no logical and epistemological significance. We agree that logic and epistemology are normative disciplines and for that reason references to past and present mathematical practices cannot constitute by themselves conclusive arguments in these fields. However such references may point to real logical and epistemological problems, which is, in our view, indeed happens in the given case. As far as deductions from ZFC are treated as ideal mathematical (or meta-mathematical) objects their epistemological role as evidences for certain mathematical statements remains unclear. In this form such deductions cannot be used as an effective tool for proof-checking. A theoretical possibility of set-theoretic formalization (justified with some meta-mathematical arguments) in practical contexts is used rather counter-positively. If some mathematical argument can be shown to be not formalizable in ZFC this is a reason to regard it as problematic (which, however, doesn't generally imply its dismissal since the given argument can be shown to be formalizable in some appropriate axiomatic extension of ZFC it interprets the existence of syntactic deduction in terms of a meta-theoretical statement that express a logical relation between theoretical statements but it provides no precise semantics for individual deductions. We shall see in 4.3 how this problem is treated with various versions of proof-theoretic logical semantics.
Secondly Tarski's Model theory allows one to associate with a given first-order Hilbert-style axiomatic theory a canonical class of its set-theoretic models [14] . For an easy example think of usual axioms for (definition) of algebraic group and their model in form of set G with a binary operation ⊗ on it, which satisfies the appropriate axioms. The canonical character of this construction allows one to define a group from the outset as a set with an additional structure, namely, with a binary operation on this set that has certain required formal properties (associativity, existence of unit and of inverse elements). This is the "semantic" semi-formal presentation used systematically by Bourbaki [1, p.30] , which has been adopted by Suppes and his followers for the representation of scientific theories beyond the scope of pure mathematics via the identification of appropriate sets with physical systems such as sets of physical particles or sets of points of the physical space-time. Importantly, the same structure type (such as the group structure type) can be determined by, i.e., be a canonical model of (in the above sense) different sets of axioms. This feature is in accord with Suppes' "semantic" view according to which a scientific theory must be identified with a particular class of models rather than a particular syntactic structure.
The semantic set-theoretic presentation of mathematical theories developed by Bourbaki and a similar representation of scientific theories developed by Suppes and other enthusiasts of the semantic view provides a theory with a sense of objecthood: it represents the content of a given theory in terms of its objects such as algebraic groups or systems of physical particles. In this way the semantic representation supports a quasi-constructive reasoning about sets and set-theoretic structures. For example, one may think of forming the powerset P (A) of given set A as a construction after the pattern of traditional geometrical constructions like the construction of a circle by its given radius. This helps one to develop within the set-theoretic mathematics a form of helpful intuition but the problem is that such set-theoretic "constructions" lack formal rules, which could be used for representing extra-logical mathematical and possibly scientific methods. When one needs to justify the "construction" of powerset in this framework one refers to the powerset axiom of ZFC, which is an existential statement that guarantees the existence of powerset for any given set. One may argue that in such contexts the difference between constructive rules and existential axioms is only a matter of taste or fasion. In the next Section we argue that this is not the case.
4.2.
Two axiomatic"styles". Hilbert and Tarski after him conceive of a theory T as an ordered set of formal sentences satisfied by a class of intended models of this theory and, ideally, not satisfied by any non-intended interpretation (the latter is a desideratum rather than a definite requirement). An interpretation of a given sentence s in this context is an assignment of certain semantic values to all non-logical symbols that belong to s. Thus this approach assumes that one distinguishes in advance logical and non-logical symbols of the given alphabet. This requirement reflects the epistemological assumption according to which logic is epistemologically prior to all theories, which are "based" on this logic.
In other words the axiomatic method in its Hilbert- Tarski and proposed an alternative approach to syntactic presentation of deductive systems, which involved relatively complex systems of rules and didn't use logical tautologies. In [8] Gentzen builds in this way two formal calculi known today as Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus. 8 We refer here to a version of axiomatic method described by Tarski But one disregards questions concerning how we know that a sentence is logically valid or follows logically from another sentence. General proof theory would thus be an attempt to supplement model theory by studying also the evidence or the process -i.e., in other words, the proofs -by which we come to know logical validities and logical consequences. [29, p. 66] Prawitz calls this conception of logic intuitionistic and, as the name suggests, sees Brouwer and Heyting as its founding fathers. Following Kolmogorov and some other important contributors to the same circle of ideas we prefer to call this approach to logic constructive.
As we have seen in 3.1 Nagel's informal conception of logic also falls under this category.
Since in this paper we discuss applications of logic in empirical sciences we would like also to point to the interpretation of proofs in constructive logic as truth-makers [39] , which may be material objects and events either artificially produced or occurred naturally.
In 1972 Per Martin-Löf accomplished a draft (published only in 1998 as [25] ) of a constructive (or intuitionistic as the author calls it) theory of types, which implements the general constructive approach outlined above. In a more mature form this system known as MLTT is presented in [21] . MLTT is a Gentzen-style typed calculus that comprises no axiom. The meaning of its syntactic rules and other syntactic elements is provided via a special semantic procedure that Martin-Löf calls the meaning explanation. In [22] the author compares the meaning explanation with a program compiler, which translates a computer program written in a higher-level programming language into a lower-level command language. According to Martin-Löf a similar appropriate translation of MLTT syntactic rules into elementary logical steps gives these rule their meaning and simultaneously justifies them. [24] . Martin-Löf's meaning explanation is an informal version of the proof-theoretic semantics mentioned in 4.2 above [37] .
In the late 2000-ies MLTT started a new life as the syntactic core of the emerging Homotopy
Type theory (HoTT) [31] .
From MLTT to HoTT
MLTT comprises four types of judgements (which should not be confused with propositions, see 7.3 below).
(i) A : T Y P E;
(ii) A ≡ T Y P E B;
In words (i) says that A is a type, (ii) that types A and B are the same, (iii) that a is a term of type A and (iv) that a and a are the same term of type A. Let me leave (i) and
(ii) aside and provide more details on (iii) and (iv).
Martin-Löf offers four different informal readings of (iii) [21, p. 5]:
(1) a is an element of set A (2) a is a proof (construction) of proposition A ("propositions-as-types") (3) a is a method of fulfilling (realizing) the intention (expectation) A (4) a is a method of solving the problem (doing the task) A (BHK semantics)
The author argues that these interpretations of judgement form (iii) not only share a logical form but also are closely conceptually related. The correspondence between (2) and (4) is based on the conceptual duality between problems and theorems, which dates back to Euclid [35] ; among more recent sources (4) Let p, q be two judgmentally different proofs of proposition saying that two terms of a given type are equal:
it may be the case that p, q, in their turn, are propositionally equal, and that there are two judgmentally different proofs p , q of this fact:
This and similar multi-layer syntactic constructions in MLTT can be continued unlimitedly.
Before the rise of HoTT it was not clear that this syntactic feature of the intensional MLTT can be significant from a semantic point of view. However it became the key point of the homotopical interpretation of this syntax. Under this interpretation
• types and their terms are interpreted, correspondingly, as spaces and their points;
• identity proofs of form p, q : P = T Q are interpreted as paths between points P, Q of space T ;
• identity proofs of the second level of form p , q : p = P = T Q q are interpreted as homotopies between paths p, q;
• all higher identity proofs are interpreted as higher homotopies;
(which is coherent since a path p : P = T Q counts as a point of the corresponding path space P = T Q, homotopies of all levels are treated similarly).
In order to get an intuitive picture the non-mathematical reader is advised to think of homotopy h between paths p, q : P = T Q as a curve surface bounded by the two paths, which share their endpoints P, Q. Given two such surfaces h, i two-homotopy f between h and i is a solid bounded by these surfaces. Picturing of higher homotopies of level ¿ 2 is more difficult because it requires a geometrical intuition that extends beyond the three spatial dimensions.
Thus the homotopical interpretation makes meaningful the complex structure of identity types in the intensional MLTT. It makes this structure surveyable, as we shall now see.
Definition 1. Space S is called contractible or space of h-level (-2) when there is point
p : S connected by a path with each point x : A in such a way that all these paths are homotopic (i.e., there exists a homotopy between any two such paths).
In what follows we refer to contractible spaces "as if they were effectively contracted" and identify such spaces with points. A more precise mathematical formulation involves the notion of homotopy equivalence, which provides a suitable identity criterion for spaces in Homotopy theory. In view of the homotopy interpretation of MLTT outlined above such spaces (defined up to the homotopy equivalence) are also called "homotopy types".
Definition 2.
We say that S is a space of h-level n + 1 if for all its points x, y path spaces x = S y are of h-level n. Notice that h-levels are not equivalence classes of spaces. The homotopical hierarchy is cumulative in the sense that all types of h-level n also qualify as types of level m for all m > n. For example pt qualifies as truth-value, as singleton set, as one-object groupoid, etc. Hereafter we call a n-type a type, which is of h-level n but not of level n − 1.
A space of h-level l (now including the infinite case l = ω) can be transformed into a space of h-level k < l via its k-truncation, which can be described as a forced identification of all homotopies (paths) of levels higher than k. In particular the (-1)-truncation of any given space S brings point pt when S is not empty and brings the empty space ∅ otherwise.
A more mathematically precise explanation of HoTT basics can be found in [31] and other special literature. For the same reason (-1)-types can be also described as truth-value types, where truth is understood constructively as the existence of proof/evidence/truth-maker.
Whether or not the proof-irrelevant conception of proposition is fully satisfactory as a working conception of proposition tout court has been recently a matter of controversy.
One may argue that in certain context people tend to think of and speak about propositions in a proof-relevant sense 9 . In our opinion this fact does not constitute a strong objection to the identification of propositions with (-1)-types because all proof-relevant aspects of propositions are taken into account at higher levels of the homotopical hierarchy as follows.
General n-type S n where n > −1 comprises:
• the "propositional layer" S −1 , which is a proposition extracted from S n via its propositional truncation, and
• the higher-order structure H present on all h-levels ¿ -1, which is a (possibly multi-layer) structure of proofs of proposition S −1 . This observation suggests the following possible application of HoTT in the formal representation of theory T :
• extra-logical rules of T (including rules for conducting observations and experiments) are MLTT rules applied at h-levels ¿ -1
• logical rules are MLTT rules applied to (-1)types. UF a significant body of up-to-date mathematical physics and made a new original contributions in this area using UF-based mathematics [36] . Even if none of this qualifies as a full-blood (representation of) physical theory such attempts show that the Gentzen-style axiomatic architecture and, more specifically, UF as a paradigm mathematical theory that uses this architecture can be used in science and support a constructive computer-based representation of scientific theories.
Modelling Rules
The main lesson of the debate between the "syntactic view" and the "semantic view", as one can see this matter after the critical analysis briefly reviewed in the above Introduction, is that the formal semantic aspect of one's representational framework is at least as much important as the syntactic one. The formal semantic of HoTT -which should not be confused with the informal notion of meaning explanation introduced in 4.3 above or with the suggestive description of types as spaces used in [31] and other introductions to HoTT -by the present date is largely a work in progress. The following discussion concerns only the Model theory of HoTT rather than its formal semantics in a more general sense and it does not intend to cover all relevant developments.
Since one leaves the familiar territory of first-order theories and their set-theoretic semantics the very notions of theory and model become problematic and require certain conceptual revisions, which are not necessarily innocent from a philosophical viewpoint as we shall now see. By a theory we shall understand here a set of formal rules as described in 1 from 4.1 together with the set of all derivations supported by these rules. What is a model of a given theory presented as just described?
Alfred Tarski designed his Model theory back in early 1950-ies having in mind Hilbert-style axiomatic theories. Let us repeat its basic definitions. A model of (uninterpreted) axiom A is an interpretation m of non-logical terms in A that makes it into a true statement A m ; if such m exists A is called satisfiable and said to be satisfied by m. Model M of uninterpreted axiomatic theory T is an interpretation that makes all its axioms and theorems true. When rules of inference used in T preserve truth (soundness) it is sufficient to check that M satisfies all axioms of T for claiming that it also satisfies all its theorems.
Since we deal with modelling a theory presented in Gentzen style rather than in Hilbert style we need a notion of modelling a rule rather than modelling an axiom. Although such a notion is not immediately found in standard textbooks on Model theory (such as [13] )
it can be straightforwardly construed on this standard basis as follows. We shall say that interpretation m is a model of rule R ( of general form 1), in symbols
when the following holds: whenever A m 1 , . . . , A m n are true statements B m is also true statement. Arguably this notion of modelling a rule is implicit in Tarski's Model theory, so it can be used for modelling HoTT without revisions (albeit with some add-ons, see below).
There are however several problems with this approach, which we list below and suggest some tentative solutions. 7.1. Logical Inference versus Semantic Consequence Relation. In the standard setting considered by Tarski (Hilbert-style axiomatic theories and their set-theoretic semantics) the above notion of modelling a rule is redundant because the syntactic rules used in this setting such as modus ponens preserve truth under all interpretations of their premises and conclusions. Moreover, one can argue in Prawitz's line (see 4. 3) that in the standard setting 2 does not provide a semantic for rule R properly but only specifies an instance of relation of logical consequence (conclusion B m follows logically from assumptions
. This is not a proper semantics for rule R, so the argument goes, because it associates with R a meta-proposition that expresses the fact that certain relation holds but doesn't tell one how one comes to knowing that fact.
In the passage quoted in 4.3 Prawitz makes an emphasis on the epistemological aspect of the above argument. However a form of this argument remains valid even if one doesn't accept the idea that the proper semantics of formal rules should be necessarily epistemic.
To make this argument work it is sufficient to assume that the proper semantics of rules should involve the concept of "how", which may be also used in non-epistemic semantic contexts such as computational models of some natural processes. So one is in a position to argue that the above propositional semantics of rules is unsatisfactory without referring to the epistemic role of these rules.
In the quoted paper Prawitz:1974 Prawitz puts forward a project of developing General Proof theory, which is supposed to complement the standard Model theory and support of a conceptual revision of Hilbert-style Proof theory. Martin-Löf's notion of meaning explanation (4.3) also provides a semantics for syntactic rules independently of Model theory. In our view, keeping the formal semantics for rules apart from Model theory can hardly be a tenable strategy today. From a mathematical point of view meaning explanations give rise to realizability models of Type theory [32] , [15] and the conceptual distinction between the two is not so easy to formulate and in any event it is not stably kept in the current literature
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. This is why it makes more sense, in our view, to revise some conceptual foundations of Model theory in the light of new developments rather than leave the conceptual core of this theory untouched and develop a formal semantics for HoTT independently. This has the following effect on the interpretation of syntactic rules. In the standard setting these rules are supposed to serve as logical rules and work equally for all legitimate interpretations of formulas. So in this setting the syntactic rules admit a default interpretation in terms of logical consequence relation. The situation is very different in HoTT and akin theories where no fixed distinction between logical and non-logical symbols is specified at the syntactic level. In that case the semantics of rules is a proper part of Model theory of HoTT -rather than a general issue that belongs to foundations of Model theory as such and is not specific to any particular theory, which one may wish to model. In case of the other three basic forms of "judgements" the situation is similar. A possible name for such basic syntactic constructions, which we borrow from Computer Science and programming practice, is "declaration". We suggest to reserve the name of judgement only for those declarations, which involve only (-1)-types.
When A 1 , . . . , A n , B are higher types the above scheme 3 represents an extra-logical rule that justifies "making up" token b from given tokens a 1 , . . . , a n . Once again the characterisation of this rule as extra-logical should be understood with a pinch of salt. The given endpoints. The first-order statement "For any pair of distinct points there exists a straight segment having these points as its endpoints" used by Hilbert in his axiomatic reconstruction of Euclidean geometry is a meta-theoretical reconstruction of Euclid's extralogical rule rather than just a logically innocent linguistic paraphrase [35] ).
When an appropriate construction c that instantiates given formal rule R is exhibited, rule notion of modelling a rule does not involve a satisfaction relation defined in terms of truthconditions, it marks a more significant departure from the conceptual foundations of Model theory laid down by Tarski back in 1950-ies. Whether or not this conceptual difference implies a significant technical difference remains unclear to the author of this paper. The
Model theory of HoTT developed by Voevodsky, which we overview in the next Section, is intended to be formalizable both in ZFC (via a meta-propositional translation described above) and in UF. The latter option amounts to using HoTT/UF as its proper meta-theory;
in this case preformal h-semantics turns into a form model-theoretic semantics. In this way h-semantics becomes formal.
Initiality: Theories as Generic Models
HoTT as presented in the HoTT Book [31] uses the syntax of MLTT extended with the Univalence Axiom; the semantic "homotopic" aspect of this theory, a central fragment of which has been briefly described above (5), remains here wholly informal: the language of the Book deliberately and systematically confuses logical and geometrical terminology referring to types as "spaces", to terms as "points" and so on. This is what we call the preformal h-semantics throughout this paper. A closer look at [17] shows that the concept of model used by the authors is quite far from being standard. In particular, the authors of this paper use techniques of Functorial The idea of Functorial Model theory can be described in form of the following construction:
• a given theory T is presented as a category of syntactic nature (a canonical syntactic model of T);
• models of T are construed as functors m : T → S from T into an appropriate background category (such as the category of sets), which preserve the relevant structure;
• models of T form a functor category C T = S T ;
• in the above context theory T is construed as a generic model , i.e., as an object (or a subcategory as in [20] ) of C T .
Voevodsky and his co-authors proceed according to a similar (albeit not quite the same) pattern:
• Construct a general model of given type theory T (MLTT or its variant) as a category C with additional structures which model T-rules. For that purpose the authors use the notion of contextual category due to Cartmell [2] ; in later works Voevodsky uses a modified version of this concept named by the author a C-system.
• Construct a particular contextual category (variant: a C-system) C(T) of syntactic character, which is called term model. Objects of C(T) are MLTT-contexts, i.e., expressions of form
taken up to the definitional equality and the renaming of free variables and its morphisms are substitutions (of the contexts into T-rule schemata) also identified up to the definitional equality and the renaming of variables). More precisely, morphisms of C(T ) are of form
where f is represented by a sequent of terms f 1 , . . . , f m such that
Thus morphisms of C(T ) represent derivations in T.
• Define an appropriate notion of morphism between contextual categories (C-systems) and form category CT XT of such categories.
• Show that C(T) is initial in CT XT , that is, that for any object C of CT XT there is precisely one morphism (functor) of form C(T) → C.
The latter proposition is stated in [17] as Theorem 1.2.9 without proof; the authors refer to [38] where a special case of this theorem is proved and mention that "the fact that it holds for other selections from among the standard rules is well-known in folklore".
The authors state that the initiality property of C(T) justifies the qualification of C (a general contextual category / C-system) as a model of T (Definition 1.2.10 in [17] ). Since the initiality condition does not belong to the conceptual background of the standard Model theory this statement calls for explanation. We offer here such an explanation in terms of our proposed constructive view of theories (2 above). Think of generic term model C(T) as a special presentation of theory T in form of instruction, i.e., a system of rules (presented symbolically). This instruction is a schematic syntactic construction; it is schematic in the sense that it is applicable to more than one context. Available contexts are objects of CT XT . The initiality property of C(T) in CT XT guarantees that in each particular context C instructionC(T) is interpreted and applied unambiguously. A useful instruction can be schematic but it cannot be ambiguous.
The initiality property of contextual categories and other relevant mathematical structures was in the focus of Vladimir Voevodsky's research during the last several years of his life and work. He considered it as a genuine open mathematical problem and dubbed it the Initiality Conjecture. This conjecture is not a mathematical statement which waits to be proved or disproved but a problem of building a general formal semantic framework for type theories, which includes a syntactic object with the initiality property as explained above. This conjecture still stands open to the date of writing the present paper.
Conclusion
We have seen that the epistemological argument between partisans of the so-called Syntactic View and the Semantic View of scientific theories, which took place in the 20th century, was at a great extent determined by basic features of formal logical tools available at that time (1, 3.2). We have also seen that Ernest Nagel, using the traditional philosophical prose, expressed epistemological views on science and on the role of logic in science, which could not be supported by formal logical means available to him in a ready-made form (3.1). This was a price payed by these people for their decision to develop epistemology and philosophy of science on a formal logical basis. This price may be or be not worth paying but one should keep in mind that formal logical tools in their turn are developed with certain intended purposes and with some ideas about the nature of logic and its epistemic role. Even if formal logic is more tightly connected to mathematics than to empirical sciences, important logical ideas may come from sciences. If a system of logic represented with a symbolic calculus does not support one's epistemological view on science this is a reason to revise both one's epistemological ideas and one's logical ideas and logical techniques. So the task of developing formal epistemology and formal representational schemes for science requires thinking about foundations of logic and mathematics rather than a mere application of some ready-made logical and mathematical tools.
In this paper we defend a constructive view of scientific theories according to which methods (including empirical, mathematical and eventually logical methods) are essential constituents of scientific theories, which should not be left out as a part of "context of discovery" or in any other way (2) . This epistemological view is certainly not original and dates back at least to René Descartes and Francis Backon. The brief word description of this view given in this paper is evidently very imprecise and allows for various specifications, many of which may be not compatible. However our aim in this paper is to support this general view with a new formal technique rather than elaborate on it using only philosophical prose.
We call this general epistemological view "constructive" referring to an essential feature of formal framework, viz. Homotopy Type theory, that we use for supporting this view; the relevant sense of being constructive we have explained in some length elsewhere [35] . In order to avoid a possible confusion let us mention here that our proposed constructive view of theories does not imply a form of epistemological constructivism that treats objects of science as mental or social constructions; in fact our constructivism is compatible with a version of scientific realism.
HoTT has emerged as a unintended homotopical interpretation of Constructive Type theory due to Martin-Löf (MLTT); MLTT in its turn has been developed as a mathematical implementation of constructive notion of logic, which focuses on proofs and inferences rather than on the relation of logical consequence between statements, and which is concerned primarily with epistemic rather than ontological issues (4. extra-logical elements are organised here differently; a major difference is that h-semantics allows for making sense of the notion of extra-logical rule (or more precisely, an extralogical application of formal rule), which is not available in the standard setting. This is a reason why we believe that a HoTT-based framework can be a better representational tool for science than the standard first-order framework.
Model theory of HoTT does not exist yet in a stable form. In this paper we discussed conceptual issues that arise when one attempts to use with HoTT and akin theories the standard notion of satisfaction due to Tarski (7). Then we reviewed a work in progress started by Voevodsky and continued by his collaborators where the category-theoretic concept of initiality (8) Admittedly, a possibility of using HoTT or a similar theory as a standard representational tool in science at this point is a philosophical speculation rather than a concrete technical proposal. Nevertheless there are reasons to believe that this new approach can be more successful than its set-theoretic ancestor. Unlike the standard set-theoretic foundations of mathematics Univalent Foundations are effective and "practical" in the sense that they allow for an effective practical formalization of non-trivial mathematical proofs and checking these proofs with the computer. An effective UF formalization of the mathematical apparatus of today's Physics and other mathematically-laden sciences paths a way to a similar effective formalization and useful digital representation of scientific theories. The step from foundations of mathematics to representation of scientific theories is by no means trivial. This paper attempts to provide conceptual preliminaries for it.
